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Introduction

Although the concepts of secularism and the separation of Church and
State are common features of modern democracies worldwide, differing
cultural histories have produced diverging views on the extent that the
freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice should limit the State’s
ability to impose secularism. The United States and France are two
democracies that place equal weight on the importance of the separation of
Church and State, yet these two nations have vastly different interpretations
of how secularism should influence the religious practices of their citizens.
On October 7, 2010, the constitutional authorities1 of France announced
that the proposed legislation banning face coverings in public places did not
violate the French Constitution.2 The law bans masks and veils that
obstruct the face in all public places. Those wearing face-covering veils
will be punished with a fine of 150 Euros and a citizenship course, and
those forcing a face-covering veil upon another will be punished with a year
in prison or a 15,000 Euro fine.3 While the law does not refer specifically
to Muslim face covering veils—known in France and throughout the world
as hijabs, niqabs, burqas, or voiles—it is implied that the Muslim
community is the primary target of this legislation, as there are few other
types of face coverings worn in modern French society. Furthermore, the
ban has made exceptions for virtually all other types of face coverings worn
in public such as ski and sanitary masks.4 The ban also does not affect
other types of Islamic head coverings such as the chador, which covers the
top of the head and the body, but not the face.
This ban has sparked worldwide debate and controversy. While
several European states approve of the ban, agreeing with the French
1. See generally RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND
METHODOLOGY 29–30 (Michael Kindred trans., Louisiana State University Press 1972)
(stating that the role of the Constitutional Council is to review all legislation and to ensure
that it is constitutional); see also Dominque Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools:
Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 377–78 (2006)
(discussing the role of the Constitutional Council as the last barrier to a bill’s legality in
France).
2. See CNN Wire Staff, French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN, Oct. 7,
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-07/world/france.burqa.ban_1_french-burqa-ban-ban-lastyear-full-face-veil?_s=PM:WORLD (announcing that the French ban on head coverings did
not violate the French Constitution or the Declaration of the Rights of Man as incorporated
into the French Constitution) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
3. See id. (noting the specificities of the French law).
4. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the mechanics of the French ban).

THE INTERSECTION OF LAICITE AND AMERICAN SECULARLISM 137
government that veils are insulting to the dignity of women, many Muslim
women, as well as many Americans, argue that the law goes too far and
violates the freedom to exercise one’s religion.5 Opponents of the ban
argue that the ban forces Muslim women to choose between obeying their
faith, thereby exposing themselves to fines and public embarrassment, and
abandoning a practice that is central to many women’s connection to and
identification with Islam.6 France, as one of the few true secular republics
in the world, is regarded as having the utmost respect for the dignity and
liberty of the individual.7 However, with growing unrest in the French
Muslim community and the resulting radicalization of Islam, France has
turned to this drastic measure, which, to many Americans, appears
impermissible. As Islam continues to be a main feature of the challenges
facing the Western world today, this recent development in France begs the
question: could this happen here?
This Note will address the constitutionality of a similar hypothetical
ban in the United States, focusing on the different analytical approaches
used in arriving at the French ban and in striking down a similar ban in the
United States. Part I will discuss the cultural and political significance of
the veil, as well as its reception in France and in the United States. Part II
will point out the similarities between the French and United States
constitutional provisions implicating the freedom of religion and will
contrast their application in light of differing views of secularism and social
norms in the two nations. Part III will explore the development of Free
Exercise jurisprudence in the United States and introduce the U.S. Supreme
Court case law on the Free Exercise Clause as well as the relevant Federal
5. See CNN Wire Staff, supra note 2 (“Some eighty-two percent of people polled
approved of a ban, while 17 percent disapproved.”). The article continued:
That was the widest support the Washington-based think tank found in any of
the five countries it surveyed. Clear majorities also backed burqa bans in
Germany, Britain and Spain, while two out of three Americans opposed it . . . .
Id.
6. See e.g. France’s Burqa Ban: Two Women Fined for Covering Faces, ABC, Sept.
25, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/frances-burqa-ban-women-fined-coveringfaces/story?id=14591682 (noting that the burqa ban essentially places Muslim women who
chose to wear a burqa under house arrest because they will be fined if they go out in public
wearing a burqa) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
7. See Saskya Vandoorne, Burqa Ban Opponent Fined by French Court, CNN, Sept.
22,
2011,
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/22/france-hands-down-first-burqa-bansentences/ (stating that French authorities argue that the burqa ban upholds French values of
equality and dignity) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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statutes. Part IV will apply U.S. case law and follow the analysis most
likely to be employed in deciding a challenge to the hypothetical
legislation. Part V will discuss the likely outcomes of challenges over the
French ban to the European Court of Justice and to the European Court of
Human Rights.
I. Cultural Perceptions of the Islamic Veil
A. The Veil as a Religious and Cultural Symbol
The belief that Muslim women should cover themselves comes
primarily from the Hadith, a collection of the Prophet Mohammed’s
teachings.8 The Hadith and the Koran both contain passages that have been
interpreted to require that a woman should cover herself to prevent men
from disrespecting her by leering at her bare face and hair; this guards her
modesty and virtue.9 Different permutations of hijab have evolved to
include the chador—covering only the head and hair—and the completely
enveloping burqa.
Today, the veil continues to be an important symbol among many
Muslims as “the single most obvious marker of faith—even more
unambiguous than a beard or a turban—thus a woman who wears hijab is
often the first choice spokesperson when a community wants to say ‘We are
serious Muslims.’”10 Although donning the hijab is discussed in the Koran,
and is therefore a theological element, the seldom recognized, modern
reality is that religion in a broad sense is no longer at the heart of one’s

8. See L. Clarke, Hijab According to the Hadith: Text and Interpretation, in THE
MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES 214, 232 (Sajida Sultana Alvi,
Homa Hoodfar & Sheila McDonough eds., 2003) (discussing the purpose of the hijab as laid
out in the Hadith).
9. See THE HOLY QUR’AN 24:31 (Yusuf Ali, trans., 1934) available at
http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/quran/index.htm [hereinafter QUR’AN] (“And say to the
believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should
not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that
they should draw their khimar over their bosoms and not display their beauty . . . .”); see
also QUR’AN 33:59 (“Those who harass believing men and believing women undeservedly,
bear a calumny and a grievous sin . . . . ”). “Enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the
wives of true believers that they should cast their outer garments over their persons: That is
most convenient, that they may be distinguished and not be harassed . . . .” Id.
10. Pamela K. Taylor, I Just Want to Be Me, in THE VEIL: WOMEN WRITERS ON ITS
HISTORY, LORE, AND POLITICS 119, 123 (Jennifer Heath ed., The University of California
Press 2008).
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decision to wear or not to wear the veil.11 As Islam is increasingly
politicized worldwide, the veil has taken on new meanings to Muslims and
non-Muslims alike.12 In addition to identifying the faith or culture of the
wearer, the veil carries a political message in many Western countries.13
Even though Muslims and non-Muslims alike have preconceived
notions about women who choose to wear the veil, the hijab and similar
face coverings can hold different meanings for different women depending
on their country of origin, their relationship with Islam, and their desire to
be affiliated with or not affiliated with a particular political movement.14
Due to differing views on womanhood and women’s rights, a veiled woman
could be perceived in the West as oppressed and dominated by men, while
the woman could be choosing to wear the veil to remind herself that she
demands respect and behaves in a confident manner.15
B. Perceptions of the Veil in France
High numbers of Muslims in France have led to an ideological gap
between France and its fellow European states when it comes to acceptance
and tolerance of Muslims.16 Outward signs of Islam—especially the veil—
have been blamed for France’s modern social problems, including
11. See Aisha Lee Fox Shaheed, Dress Codes and Modes: How Islamic is the Veil?,
in THE VEIL: WOMEN WRITERS ON ITS HISTORY, LORE, AND POLITICS 290, 293 (Jennifer
Heath, ed. The University of California Press, 2008) (“Whether Islam requires women to
cover their heads and/or faces is perhaps less pertinent to women’s lived experiences than
whether their families, local religious authorities, and governments require them to cover
themselves.”). “For this reason, contemporary debates around the veil should begin with
politics rather than theology. . . .” Id.
12. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 121 (suggesting that September 11, 2001 was a
turning point for Western perceptions of the veil).
13. See id. at 125 (discussing the relationship between the Islamist movement,
political Islam, and the hijab).
14. See id. (“I believe that hijab should mean only what it means to the individual
wearing it. . . .”); see also Shaheed, supra note 11, at 293 (referring to women in Central
Asia who chose to veil purely to identify with Middle Eastern communities following the
collapse of the Soviet Union).
15. See Sigrid Nokel, Islam, Gender and Dialogue: On Body Politics and BioPolitics, in ISLAM AND THE NEW EUROPE: CONTINUITIES, CHANGES, CONFRONTATIONS 178,
183 (Sigrid Nokel & Levent Tezcan eds., 2006) (pointing out that, for many Muslim women,
the veil is not a sign of oppression but a sign of dignity and respect for the wearer).
16. See Muslims in Europe:
Country Guide, BBC, Dec. 23, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm (demonstrating France’s higher Muslim
population compared to other European countries) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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communalism, sexism, and Islamism.17 Islamism in particular is thought to
pose a threat to the French way of life and the foundational concept of
secularism.18 Islamism is seen as a danger to French society because it is
not viewed as a religion but as “a political project to reshape public life
around Islamic norms. Because it takes religion out of its proper, private
domain, Islamism violates French political ideals and social norms.”19 In
the French view, the preservation of French ideals requires that public
displays of religion appearing to support Islamism be removed from the
public sphere.20 Contrary to the true reasons that many Muslim women
wear veils, it is a commonly held belief in French society that women wear
veils to publicly identify themselves as Muslim, and to send a religious
message amounting to proselytism.21 Under the French interpretation of
secularism known as laicite, an aspect of French culture that will later be
discussed in detail, this type of public message is not permitted.22
Furthermore, many French citizens are simply put off by what they see as a
public and ostentatious display of difference that many types of hijab often
inflict.23
17. See JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE
STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 155 (2007) (“By early 2002, many French journalists,
intellectuals, and officials increasingly linked the problem of scarves in schools with three
other problems in society: communalism, Islamism and sexism.”). “Many in France
became deeply worried and frightened about these problems, and therefore about the social
effects of the voile.” Id.
18. See Eleanor Beardsley, France's Burqa Ban Adds to Anti-Muslim Climate, NPR,
Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/04/11/135305409/frances-burqa-ban-adds-to-antimuslim-climate (discussing the French sentiment that the burqa isolates and separates
Muslim women from society) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
19. BOWEN, supra note 17, at 182.
20. See id. at 182 (“Public signs of Islam must be pushed back into the private sphere,
in order to ‘send a message,’ as legislators often said in the February 2004 debates, that the
Republic values its laicite.”).
21. See id. at 193 (noting that those in opposition to the banning of veils in public
schools disapproved of the government's assumption that women veil themselves to send a
message to others, rather than as part of their faithful observance of their religion).
22. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and
social Republic.”). The Constitution continues:
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a
decentralised basis.
Id.
23. See BOWEN, supra note 17, at 211–12 (quoting an excerpt from a conversation
with a French woman who feels that women wearing the hijab in public are aggressors: “It
was that they were throwing their difference right at me, that they had these principles, and
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The French perception of the veil goes beyond the concern with public
religious affiliation and political movements. Much of the animosity
against the hijab in France stems from the French interest in upholding the
dignity and equality of all citizens, including women.24 Those supporting
the 2004 ban on headscarves in state schools identified three gender related
problems the veil caused: “school girls were pressured by men and boys to
wear the voile; the voile intrinsically attacked the dignity and the equal
status of women; and, because it did so, it encouraged violence against
women living in the poor suburbs.”25 In a society in which the high
population of poor, frustrated young Muslims is seen to result in the
radicalization of Islam,26 the veil is perceived as the most public and
tangible symbol of a dangerous movement threatening republicanism.27
C. Perceptions of the Veil in the United States
Although American society does not ail from the same widespread and
often systemic conflict between the Muslim community and the general
population that marks France, prejudice and animosity towards Muslims
still exists, especially towards those who publicly display their faith by
donning religious garments such as the hijab.28 Like in many other
countries with a sizeable Muslim community, “many Diaspora Muslims
have difficulty harmonizing their belonging to a religious (and often
visible) minority with their citizenship in countries that harbor residual
colonial ideas even while they try to make sense of the rise of political
Islam in the Muslim world.”29 After the September 11th attacks, tension
surrounding Islamic veils has increased in America because they are often
seen as symbols of violence against the West and of discrimination against
were making me notice them”).
24. See id. at 208 (“The sexism argument strongly appealed to French principles and
emotions concerning the equality and dignity of women.”).
25. Id.
26. See Custos, supra note 1, at 398 (“The working-class extraction or unemployed
status coupled with the socio-cultural ghettoization and the experience of racism by many
Muslims in France offers an ideal breeding ground for [destabilization of secularism] . . . .”).
27. See id. (“In such a context, the wearing of the Islamic veil . . . [is] interpreted not
so much in light of its religious dimension as in light of its political significance.”).
28. See id. at 121 (discussing prejudices in American society against women who wear
veils).
29. THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA xv (Sajida Sultana Alvi, Homa Hoodfar &
Sheila McDonough eds., Women’s Press 2003).
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women.30 As the United States does not adhere to France’s strict
interpretation of secularism, it is not considered offensive to wear symbols
of one’s religion in public.31
II. Relevant Constitutional Provisions
A. The Constitutions of the United States and France
Both the United States and the French constitutions contain provisions
protecting the freedom of religion and upholding the secular nature of the
state: Article VI of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the freedom to hold
public office without regard to religious affiliation;32 Article 6 of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims that all citizens are eligible to
participate in the representative government.33 Both U.S. and French legal
traditions also emphasize the absence of a state religion.34 The Free
Exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution mirrors the First Article of the
French Constitution, which requires the state to respect all religious
beliefs.35 Applying the texts of the constitutions of France and of the
30. See id. (“Non-Muslim Americans in general . . . are often quick to judge Muslim
women who wear the head scarf . . . as oppressed, in need of liberation and
empowerment . . . . ”). “Thus, the hijab is, more and more, being associated with violence
and intolerance.” Id.
31. See Thomas S. Kidd, Religious Freedom Under Assault, USA TODAY,
Aug. 21, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-08-21-religion-freedompersecution_n.htm (discussing the value of America’s various religious freedoms and alleged
threats to those freedoms) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any office or public Trust under the United States.”).
33. See THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN § 6 (Fr. 1789) (“All citizens, being
equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions
and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their
virtues and talents.”).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”); see also Law of Dec. 9, 1905, Journal Officiel de la
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205 (declaring
the absence of an official state religion in France and the separation of Church and State).
35. See U.S. CONST amend. I (establishing that Congress may not prohibit the free
exercise of religion); see also 1958 CONST. art. I (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible,
secular, democratic and social Republic.”). The French Constitution continues:
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.
Id.
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United States to the French ban, it appears that neither document, on its
face, would permit the state to ban a practice so closely connected to the
faithful exercise of certain religions.
B. Laicite and the French Constitution
Although, among Western nations, the United States and France are
the only secular republics, the French interpretation of secularism differs
greatly from the American interpretation due to the principle of laicite.36
This principle renders otherwise comparable provisions of the United States
and French constitutions divergent.37 Laicite is embedded in Article I of the
French Constitution; the concept emphasizes that religion is a strictly
private matter not to enter the public or political sphere.38 While, in the
American view, adherence to laicite may seem to counter the free exercise
of religion, France believes that it actually protects freedom of religion.39
When religion does enter the public realm, it is secondary to legal, secular
norms, and the State may restrict the public exercise of religion if the action
contradicts State law.40 Due to this hierarchy, the French government may
legally prevent public employees, such as teachers in State schools, from
wearing religious garb to work or from praying conspicuously during the

36. See Custos, supra note 1, at 339 (“[T]he United States and France are said to be
the only true secular republics.”).
37. See id. at 340 (stating that, although the French and U.S. constitutions appear to
provide the same protections for religious freedom, the French concept of laicite causes the
French provisions to be interpreted differently).
38. 1958 CONST art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and
social Republic.”). The Constitution continues:
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a
decentralised basis.
Id.
39. See John L. Allen, Benedict Makes a Case for ‘Healthy Secularism’, Nat’l Cath.
Rep., Sept. 12, 2008, http://ncronline.org/node/1798 (“[I]t is fundamental . . . to insist upon
the distinction between the political realm and that of religion in order to preserve both the
religious freedom of citizens and the responsibility of the state toward them. . . .”) (quoting
Pope Benedict XVI) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
40. See Custos, supra note 1, at 341 (“[T]he protection of religious norms must yield
to the legal norms because of the hierarchy between the State and religions’ respective
normative orders . . . .”). “Because State order supersedes religious order, the State may
restrict the expression of the religious order whenever it runs counter to State rules.” Id.
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workday.41 Prior to the ban on head coverings, the French government
banned the conspicuous display of religious signs in public schools.42 Like
the statute in question, the 2004 ban was enacted in defense of laicite.43
The State emphasized that the ban, like the concept of laicite, was not
meant to trample on religious freedom, but to uphold it.44 Unlike under
U.S. law and jurisprudence, any form of religious expression that threatens
laicite may be regulated or banned by the State under French law.45
III. Applicable United States Case Law and Statutes
A. Early Free Exercise Decisions
United States case law in the area of religious freedom in the public
sphere is both extensive and evolving. The Supreme Court considered this
issue in 1961 with Braunfeld v. Brown,46 a case involving a Pennsylvania
law requiring that all businesses close on Sundays.47 Petitioners were
Orthodox Jewish merchants alleging that the Sunday closing requirement
impaired the group’s ability to earn a livelihood because they observed the
Friday Sabbath.48 Whereas non-Orthodox Jews were able to work six days
a week, while observing the Sabbath on Sunday, Orthodox Jews could only
work five days a week in order to keep the Sabbath and obey the state
41. See id. at 342 (discussing religious restrictions placed on State employees and on
students in State schools).
42. See Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5109 (prohibiting the
wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, including overly large crosses
and veils).
43. See Custos, supra note 1, at 343 (“[T]he new law is meant to be an act of defense
of French secularism, or laicite, for this fundamental principle was deemed to be under
attack.”). “It was argued that, given the central place of laicite in the French politico-legal
system, the protean contest which had developed, threatened one of the bases of the social
fabric and had to be neutralized.” Id.
44. See id. at 360 (linking the prohibition of wearing conspicuous religious symbols in
public schools with ensuring equal opportunity and ending societal discrimination).
45. See id. at 363 (“[A] hierarchy was established that ranked laicite as supreme
whenever it was threatened by certain forms of religious expression.”).
46. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (finding that Pennsylvania’s
Sunday closing law did not violate the Free Exercise rights of members of the Orthodox
Jewish faith).
47. See id. at 601 (describing the statute at issue in the case).
48. See id. (introducing appellants as Orthodox Jews who were unable to work on
Sundays).
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statute.49 The statute, in effect, forced petitioners to give up a “basic tenet
of the Orthodox Jewish faith” or be rendered unable to continue in their
trade.50 The Court acknowledged that the government could not restrict
religious exercise in any way, but that the freedom to act, “even when the
action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from
legislative restrictions.”51 The Court relied on an earlier case, Reynolds v.
United States,52 in which the Court upheld the polygamy conviction of a
member of the Mormon Church, even though the man’s religion
commanded him to engage in polygamy.53 This case is distinguished from
the veil ban because polygamy had a longstanding status as a criminal
offense in the United States before the accused challenged the law.54 The
Court determined that allowing citizens to avoid criminal liability due to
religious belief would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under
such circumstances.”55 Reynolds also made no distinction between
religious beliefs and personal beliefs based on non-religious motivations.56
This case established the rule that, if a religious practice conflicts with the
public interest, the government may constitutionally proscribe the activity.57
The Court construed the public interest fairly broadly, determining that
because marriage is a cornerstone of Western civilization, the government
may “determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social
life under its dominion.”58 This interpretation of public interest leaves open
to government regulation any religious practice that conflicts with a value

49. See id. (“. . . Sunday closing will result in impairing the ability of all appellants to
earn a livelihood . . . .”).
50. Id. at 601–02.
51. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
52. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (finding that religious duty is
not a defense to a criminal indictment).
53. See id. at 168 (finding that religious duty is not a defense to a criminal indictment).
54. See id. at 161–65 (discussing the history of polygamy in the United States and in
other nations).
55. Id. at 167.
56. See id. (“It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was
still belief, and belief only.”).
57. Id. at 165–66 (finding that marriage is a cornerstone of society that deeply affects
the public interest).
58. Id. at 166.
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that goes to the foundation of American society. This rule would be refined
and narrowed in subsequent free exercise cases.59
In holding that Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law did not violate the
free exercise of the Orthodox Jewish faith, the Braunfeld Court generated
the principle that a generally applicable rule aimed at restricting a secular
activity is not per se unconstitutional simply because it produces an
incidental effect on certain religious groups. Due to the immense religious
diversity of the United States, to hold such legislation as per se
unconstitutional due to the incidental adverse effect on a certain group
would unreasonably restrict the legislature.60 Justice Brennan’s reasoning
in his concurring and dissenting opinion is especially applicable to the
French ban on head coverings. Brennan’s analysis focused on the
protection of individual liberty, as opposed to the collective goals and
public interest of the community at large.61 Brennan also focused on the
fact that the effect of the law was that no one could be an Orthodox Jew and
be competitive in a market that included those who observed the Sunday
Sabbath.62 Perhaps most importantly, Brennan pointed out that the Court
failed to evaluate the level of the state’s interest.63 While having the entire
community rest on the same day is convenient, it does not reach the level of
a compelling state interest.64
Following Braunfeld in Free Exercise jurisprudence is Sherbet v.
Verner,65 a case involving a similar set of facts as Braunfeld. A South
Carolina statute denied appellant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, unemployment
benefits due to her inability to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her
faith.66 The Court reiterated the Braunfeld dicta that the Free Exercise
59. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing modern case law on point).
60. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605–07 (stating that the legislature cannot be expected
to refrain from enacting laws that have incidental effects on the unique practices of certain
religious groups).
61. See id. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I would approach this
case differently . . . [and] look primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather
than towards the fulfillment of collective goals.”).
62. See id. at 613 (“Their effect is that no one may at one and the same time be an
Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sunday-observing fellow tradesmen.”).
63. See id. at 614 (arguing that the state interest is “the mere convenience of having
everyone rest on the same day”).
64. See id. (comparing the asserted state interest in having all citizens rest
simultaneously to the genuine interest in protecting marriage or protecting children).
65. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that South Carolina’s denial
of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment).
66. See id. at 399–400 (describing the appellant and the issue before the Court).
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Clause prohibits the government from regulating religious beliefs, but again
acknowledged that in instances in which such regulations are upheld, “the
conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace, or order.”67 The Court laid out the test,
followed in subsequent cases, that in order for a regulation to pass muster, it
must either impose no unconstitutional burden on the freedom of religion,
or there must be a compelling state interest in regulating the area that
overrides any affect on Free Exercise.68 The Court went on to apply
Braunfeld’s test of general applicability, determining that, although the
statute was generally applicable, the appellant’s ineligibility derived solely
from her religious beliefs.69 This is a test that would be clarified in
subsequent Supreme Court cases.70 In effect, the statute forced the
appellant to either follow her religion and not receive vital unemployment
benefits, or abandon a central tenet of her faith and accept work.71 This was
a choice that the Court believed to be fundamentally unacceptable in light
of the Constitution. Conditioning the availability of benefits on one’s
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties and can only be
justified by a compelling state interest.72 It is important to note that the
Sherbet Court clarified Justice Brennan’s emphasis on evaluating the
compelling state interest in his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Braunfeld.73 Taking into consideration the State’s asserted interest in
preventing fraudulent claims for unemployment benefits, the Court
determined that mere convenience does not rise to the level of a compelling
state interest, and South Carolina’s interest therefore did not override the
67. See id. at 403 (pointing out the actions evaluated under Braunfeld have posed a
threat to public order).
68. See id. (discussing the requirements that South Carolina’s statute must meet in
order to withstand a constitutional challenge).
69. See id. at 404 (“[A]ppellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from
the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is
unmistakable.”).
70. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores and
Employment Division v. Smith).
71. See Sherbet, 374 U.S. at 404 (1963) (“The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”).
72. See id. at 406 (“Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this
appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”).
73. See id. at 407 (assessing the legitimacy of the asserted state interest).
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appellant’s right to free exercise of religion.74 From this decision emerged
what would come to be known as the Sherbet test: the first prong asks
whether the state’s actions substantially burden a religious practice; if it
does, the second prong asks whether the burden is justified by a compelling
government interest.75 Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion is especially
relevant to the regulation at issue in this Note. Justice Douglas points out
that the United States is a religiously diverse nation, and that many of these
religions, such as Islam, require followers to adhere to practices that differ
from those of the majority of society; these practices are “protected by the
First Amendment but could easily be trod upon under the guise of ‘police’
or ‘health’ regulations reflecting the majority’s views.”76
B. Modern Applications of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Following Braunfeld and Sherbet, the Court was confronted with
several cases that challenged the applicability of the Sherbet test.
Employment Division v. Smith77 involved a state statute that imposed
criminal sanctions for the ceremonial use of peyote.78 Respondents were
members of the Native American Church who were fired from their jobs for
the religious use of peyote and, as a consequence, denied unemployment
benefits because the state criminalized peyote use.79 Respondents urged
that the proper standard of review was the Sherbet test, asking whether
there was a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if so, whether
there was a compelling government interest justifying that burden.80 As a
threshold matter, the Court declined to apply the Sherbet standard of
review, determining that Sherbet is limited to unemployment cases.81
74. See id. (finding that the asserted state interest does not reach a compelling level).
75. See id. at 403–06 (outlining and discussing the two prongs).
76. Id. at 411 (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (deciding that the state may
prohibit peyote use, and therefore may also deny unemployment benefits to those convicted
of peyote use under the state statute).
78. See id. at 874–75 (summarizing the facts and posture of the case).
79. See id. (explaining the events that led to respondents being denied unemployment
benefits).
80. See id. at 882–83 (“Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally
applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors,
at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set
forth in Sherbet v. Verner . . . .”).
81. See id. at 883–84 (declining to apply the Sherbet balancing test outside the scope
of unemployment compensation).
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Although Smith does involve a claim for unemployment benefits, the issue
before the Court was limited to whether the state could constitutionally
prohibit the religious use of peyote, rendering the Sherbet test
inapplicable.82 This case is also distinguished from the Sherbet line of
cases because the conduct at issue in the unemployment cases was not
illegal, unlike the use of peyote.83 The Court reasoned that application of
the Sherbet test in this case would result in a constitutional anomaly: It
would allow citizens to claim religious conviction to avoid following
properly promulgated laws, making “‘professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.’”84 The Court also declined to require a
compelling state interest, determining that that particular requirement
should be limited to upholding equality of treatment (equal protection
cases) and free speech, and it should not be used to create a private right to
be immune from generally applicable laws.85 The Court appeared to
address Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion from Sherbet, but comes to
the opposite conclusion that religious scruples, such as the obligation to use
peyote, do not relieve one of the duty to obey generally applicable laws.86
Furthermore, because this case did not implicate other constitutional rights,
such as the right to raise children according to one’s own beliefs, the Court
determined that it was not a hybrid case and should not receive strict
scrutiny.87 Instead, the Court subjected the statute to a far more lenient
review, asking only whether the burden on exercise of religion was merely
an incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid law. If so,
the First Amendment would not be implicated.88

82. See id. at 876 (limiting the Court’s inquiry to whether Oregon may constitutionally
prohibit the use of peyote).
83. See id. at 877–78 (emphasizing the significance of the legality of the conduct at
issue in assessing the applicability of the Sherbet test).
84. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)).
85. See id. at 885–86 (drawing a distinction between the types of situations requiring a
compelling state interest and the situation in Smith).
86. See id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate.”).
87. See id. at 881–82 (listing precedent involving hybrid situations and indicating that
Smith does not trigger other constitutional rights).
88. See id. at 878 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion is . . . merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.”).
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In direct response to the Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).89 The RFRA
restored the compelling interest test used in Sherbet, prohibited the
government from interfering with the free exercise of religion, even if the
government action is of general applicability, without demonstrating a
compelling state interest, and made the legislation applicable to all federal
and state laws.90 This legislation restored the compelling interest test and
required courts to analyze Free Exercise claims under strict scrutiny.
The Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores91 reflected its reaction
to the RFRA. Flores involved a challenge under the RFRA to a zoning
ordinance as applied to a church.92 To express dissatisfaction with RFRA,
the Court did not consider the merits of the case, but determined that the
threshold issue was the constitutionality of the RFRA itself.93 In passing
RFRA, Congress relied on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows
Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the substantive
provisions of the Amendment.94 While the government argued that
Congress’ power under § 5 is not limited to remedial or preventative
legislation, the Court reasoned that the power is limited to enforcing the
substantive measures of the amendment.95 Allowing Congress to enact
such legislation would upset the balance of the separation of powers, as
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is”; it is the Court’s duty to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred.96 The Court formulated a test for determining the
validity of enforcement legislation: In order to pass muster, the legislation
must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or

89. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (1993) (restoring the
application of strict scrutiny to any action burdening the free exercise of religion).
90. See id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (requiring a compelling state interest to interfere in the
free exercise of religion).
91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (finding that RFRA was not
appropriate enforcement action under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
contradicted the doctrine of separation of powers).
92. See id. at 511–12 (introducing the facts and posture of the case).
93. See id. at 511 (limiting the Court’s inquiry to the constitutionality of the RFRA).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to enact proper
legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment).
95. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 518–19 (finding that Congress’ power under the
enforcement clause is limited to enforcing the substantive provisions of the amendment).
96. See id. at 519 (stating that Congress may not enact enforcement legislation that
changes the substance of the right itself).
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remedied.97 Applying this rule to the facts in Flores, the Court considered
the legislative history behind the rule and whether there had been a history
of unconstitutional religious discrimination.98 In deciding whether the
statute was proportionate to a legitimate end, the Court looked for a
termination date and mechanism, and limitations on the statute’s
implementation.99 After making these inquiries, the Court determined that
because RFRA was not proportional or responsive to an unconstitutional
behavior, it was not appropriate legislation under § 5.100
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah101 is
particularly applicable in this case because the Court dealt with an
ordinance that seemed to target a specific religious group, just as the
headscarf ban targets Muslims.102 This case also relied and expanded upon
the Smith line of analysis.103 The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye involved
the Santeria religion and an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice under
certain circumstances.104 A vital part of Santeria is the practice of animal
sacrifice.105 When a Santeria Church leased land in the city of Hialeah with
the intention of building a museum and a cultural center, the community
became alarmed and held an emergency council meeting.106 This meeting
resulted in several ordinances prohibiting religious practices adverse to the
public morality, peace, and safety, including the unnecessary slaughter of
animals.107 The ordinances were drafted such that few sacrifices and

97. See id. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”).
98. See id. at 530 (determining that the legislative history lacked any evidence of
generally applicable laws being passed to prevent unconstitutional religious discrimination).
99. See id. at 532–33 (finding that the RFRA lacked proportionality).
100. See id. at 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance.”).
101. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (determining that the city's ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
discriminatory and the city lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on the Santeria
religion).
102. See id. at 538 (finding that the ordinance inappropriately targeted the Santeria
religion).
103. See id. at 531–32 (applying the Smith requirements).
104. See id. at 524–30 (summarizing the facts and posture of the case).
105. See id. at 524–25 (explaining the role of animal sacrifice in the Santeria religion).
106. See id. at 526 (describing the events leading up to the creation of the ordinance).
107. See id. (indicating that the ordinance addressed practices believed to be adverse to
public welfare, including the unnecessary slaughter of animals).
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killings were prohibited except for those by the Santeria church.108
Following the Smith framework, the Court first determined whether the
series of ordinances were facially neutral by first looking at the text; a rule
lacks facial neutrality “if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernible from the language or context.”109 After determining
that the ordinances were facially neutral, the Court noted that facial
neutrality on its own is not conclusive, as the “Free Exercise Clause
protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as
overt.”110 The Court then looked at the object of the ordinance and its
effect.111 Because the operation of the ordinances exclusively burdened the
Santeria religion, the ordinances were collectively discriminatory in
The Court then considered the ordinances’ general
application.112
applicability, noting that neutrality and general applicability were closely
related; absence of one is strong evidence of the absence of the other.113
Because the ordinances were broad, prohibiting animal sacrifice even when
it does not affect public health and safety, and because nondiscriminatory
alternatives would have achieved the alleged government interest, the Court
determined that the ordinances were clearly not generally applicable.114
The Court also noted that an Equal Protection type of analysis would be
useful in determining the neutrality of the ordinances.115 Although the
failure of the ordinances to meet neutrality and general applicability ends
the analysis, the Court did mention that, had that not been the case, the
alleged government interest would not have justified the burden on
Santeria.116 The ends were under-inclusive and clearly not narrowly
108. See id. at 535–36 (allowing an exception for numerous types of slaughter,
including kosher slaughter under the Jewish faith).
109. Id. at 533.
110. Id. at 534.
111. See id. at 535 (“Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is
strong evidence of its object.”).
112. See id. at 535–38 (finding that the ordinances exclusively burden the Santeria
religion, negating any genuine government interest in preventing the slaughter of animals).
113. See id. at 542–43 (analyzing whether the ordinances are generally applicable as
required by Smith)
114. See id. at 543 (“Despite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to
animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by
religious sacrifice.”). “Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are
either not prohibited or approved by express provision.” Id.
115. See id. at 540 (suggesting that the Court may look at legislative history, as in an
equal protection analysis, to determine the neutrality of the ordinances).
116. See id. at 546 (“[E]ven were the governmental interests compelling, the ordinances
are not drawn in narrow terms to accomplish those interests.”).
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tailored; “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest
order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital
interest unprohibited.”117
IV. Application of United States Law to a Potential Ban on Head
Coverings
A. Application of Case Law
It is unlikely that a ban similar to the French veil ban would survive a
challenge under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The compelling state interests of ensuring public safety and upholding
secularism asserted in the French case would not outweigh the burden
imposed on the free exercise of religion under any modern American
jurisprudence.118 Case law in the area of the free exercise of religion has
established that:
[T]he general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice . . . . A law failing to satisfy these requirements must
be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
119
tailored to advance that interest.

Part III of this Note introduced Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye as a
landmark case in freedom of religion jurisprudence.120 Because the
ordinances were found to clearly target a specific religious group, Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye is an apt case to apply to a potential ban of head
coverings.121 Application of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye analysis
begins with an examination of the legislation’s neutrality.122 Facial
neutrality can be ascertained by simply looking to the legislation’s text; “[a]
law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
117. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
118. See discussion infra Part IV.A (weighing the French government’s asserted
interest in enacting the statute against the burden imposed on the free exercise of religion).
119. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531–32 (1993) (citing
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
120. See discussion supra Part III.B (summarizing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye in
relation to the French statute at issue).
121. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535 (showing that the
ordinance specifically targeted Santeria sacrifice).
122. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the first step in the Court’s analysis).

154

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 135 (2011)

meaning discernible from the language or context.”123 Article 1 of the Law
Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public Spaces forbids all
citizens from wearing clothing in public spaces that conceals the face.124
Article 2 states that the ban does not apply to veils otherwise permitted by
law or to veils worn for health or professional reasons, or to veils worn as
part of a sporting event or an artistic or traditional festival.125 The
remaining substantive portions of the regulation, Articles 3 and 4, impose a
fine of over $40,000 on those who, through violence or abuse of power,
force a woman to wear a face-covering veil.126 Following Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye’s analysis, it must be concluded that the French ban is
facially neutral under U.S. jurisprudence. There is no reference to Islam,
the hijab or any other type of Islamic head covering.127 While Article 4
could be interpreted to target Muslim families that require female members
to veil themselves, the law takes a secular approach to this circumstance.128
Therefore, while the text of the law is “consistent with the claim of facial
discrimination . . . the argument is not conclusive.”129 It should be noted
that, although the majority in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was
focused mainly on the facial neutrality of the legislation, Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion discusses the possibility of examining substantive
neutrality as well.130 Souter concedes that substantive neutrality was not at
issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, as the ordinance clearly lacked
facial neutrality.131 The majority also acknowledges that legislation
targeting “religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by
mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”132 This is an
123. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 533.
124. Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344.
125. See id. (providing exceptions for face covering veils otherwise permitted by law,
veils worn for health reasons, sporting events, and traditional festivals).
126. See id. (imposing different levels of sanctions for violating the ban).
127. Id.
128. See id. (applying Article 4 generally, with no reference to Muslims or Islam).
129. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 534.
130. See id. at 561–62 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[O]ur common notion of neutrality is
broad enough to cover not merely what might be called formal neutrality . . . but also what
might be called substantive neutrality, which . . . would generally require government to
accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral
laws.”).
131. See id. at 563 (“That proposition is not at issue in this case, however, for Hialeah’s
animal-sacrifice ordinances are not neutral under any definition, any more than they are
generally applicable.”).
132. Id. at 534.
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important distinction in the headscarf case, as the legislation appears neutral
on its face.133 However, an examination of the legislation’s effect indicates
that it is not substantively neutral. While the text bans clothing disguising
the face in public spaces in general, it effectively curtails the rights of
Muslims.134 This is because neither Christianity nor Judaism requires
followers to cover their faces.135 Therefore, the law would produce a
disparate impact by constricting the ability of Muslims to practice their
religion, while having little or no effect on followers of other widely
practiced religions.
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Court then examined the
general applicability of the ordinance.136 Assuming that the government
interest in the hypothetical American legislation mirrors that of the French
government, national security and the protection of secularism, the
headscarf ban is under-inclusive and therefore lacks general applicability.
As to national security, the ban is under-inclusive because it provides
exceptions to almost all circumstances in which a veil would be worn,
excluding a veil worn for religious purposes.137 If the government truly
wanted to further the interest of national security through this legislation, it
would not have provided exceptions for sporting events and festivals. The
legislation is also under-inclusive with regard to the government’s interest
in promoting secularism. The legislation does not apply to garments worn
by nuns, priests, or other religious figures in public places, but only to those
garments that would cover the face.138 Secularism is no more threatened by
the donning of headscarves in public places than it is by religious figures

133. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing the neutrality of the French
legislation).
134. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344 (providing exceptions
for most other types of face covering veils worn in modern French society).
135. See Custos, supra note 1, at 381 (distinguishing between contemporary Muslim
interpretations that instruct female Muslims to cover their faces and contemporary
Christianity’s lack of such a requirement).
136. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 542 (1993) (“We turn next
to a second requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the rule that laws burdening religious
practice must be of general applicability.” (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990))).
137. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344 (allowing veils to be
worn for health reasons, sporting events, festivals, and all otherwise permissible purposes).
138. See id. (describing exceptions to the French law that prohibits face concealment in
public).
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wearing their official robes in public. Due to its under-inclusive nature, the
legislation cannot be said to satisfy the general applicability requirement.139
Following Supreme Court jurisprudence, a law imposing a burden on
the exercise of religion that is neither neutral nor of general applicability
must undergo a strict scrutiny analysis.140 This standard requires that such a
law advance compelling state interests and “be narrowly tailored in pursuit
of those interests.”141 To determine whether a compelling state interest
exists, we must look to whether the state attempted to enact measures to
regulate other types of conduct threatening that interest.142 In this case, it
has already been established that the government failed to regulate other
types of religious conduct or non-religious conduct in furtherance of
national security and the promotion of secular values.143 Therefore, the
government cannot claim that a headscarf ban would further these interests.
Due to the under-inclusive nature of the legislation, it is unlikely that a U.S.
court would find that it is narrowly tailored. There are other, more narrow,
options to further the same interests without imposing such a burden on
religion. The government could implement plans that target violent and
radical groups regardless of ideology, or programs that assist women who
suffer from gender-related oppression regardless of the source. As to the
promotion of secularism, the government could require civics classes in
schools that address the importance of the separation of Church and State.
The veil ban is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest,
and would not survive a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause.
B. Application of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
Because the hypothetical headscarf case involves a federal regulation,
it is also subject to the RFRA.144 The RFRA restored the compelling
139. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 542 (concluding that
under inclusion that is substantial does not advance a legitimate government interest and
fails the test of general applicability).
140. See id. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 546–47 (stating the test for determining whether a compelling state
interest exists).
143. See discussion supra Part IV.A (showing that the ban does not mention religious
conduct other than covering one’s face and does not seek to regulate non-religious conduct
to promote national security or secularism).
144. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (holding that RFRA is
invalid only as it applies to local and state regulation).
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interest test set forth in Sherbet in all cases where the free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened.145
The key difference between
application of the RFRA and application solely of Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye is that neutral laws substantially affecting the free exercise of
religion are subject to strict scrutiny under the RFRA.146 Under this
analysis, the fact finder must first ask whether the regulation “imposes any
burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.”147 In this case, the
face-covering ban clearly places a substantial burden on the free exercise of
Islam for those who believe they must cover their faces as part of their
religion. The hypothetical appellant’s penalty is derived solely from her
choice to cover her face in the practice of her religion, and there is
enormous pressure upon her to abandon this aspect of her faith.148 She is
forced to choose between faithfully practicing her religion and continuing
to pay large punitive fines. Under the Sherbet analysis, we must then ask
whether a compelling government interest justifies the burden on
appellant’s practice of her religion.149 While national security and the
separation of Church and State are compelling interests, the government
must show that there are no alternatives that could further these interests
without infringing on the appellant’s First Amendment rights.150 As
discussed above, there are alternative possibilities that could further these
interests without burdening the free exercise of religion. Applying the
Sherbet test, the hypothetical headscarf ban would not survive a First
Amendment challenge under the RFRA.
V. Possible Challenge to European Union Judicial Bodies
This Note will now return to the veil ban’s operation in France and
explore the potential outcomes to a suit challenging the ban’s
145. See Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2010) (restoring
the Sherbet test for all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened).
146. See id. (subjecting all laws to strict scrutiny, regardless of the neutrality of the
legislation).
147. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
148. See id. at 404 (pointing out that the regulation created an “unmistakable” pressure
upon the appellant to give up an important religious practice).
149. See id. at 406 (turning to the question of whether a compelling state interest
justified the substantial infringement of the appellant’s right to the free exercise of religion).
150. See id. at 407 (noting that—to show a compelling interest—the state would be
required to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation address the same issue
without also infringing on the free exercise of religion).
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constitutionality.
Because the French Constitutional Council has
determined that the veil ban is constitutional, it is unlikely that a French
litigant would be able to obtain favorable verdict in response to a challenge
to the ban’s constitutionality. However, were French petitioners to exhaust
all judicial challenges within France, they would have two causes of action
available at the supra-national level: A challenge to the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg (ECJ) and a challenge to the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg, France (ECHR).151
A. Challenge to the European Court of Justice
A potential challenger to the French statute could bring her case to the
ECJ on the grounds that the statute violates the principle of equality
embedded in Article 10 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental
Rights or in the Race Discrimination directive.152 Article 10 provides for
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religions; the language implies that
the European Union (E.U.) recognizes the general principle of equality.153
The ECJ handles discrimination cases based on the principles that
“comparable situations are not to be treated differently” and “different
situations are not to be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively
justified.”154 The French statute falls within the second of these two
principles because of the difference between religions that require followers
to cover their heads and religions that do not.155 Christianity does not
require its adherents to cover their faces, so its practitioners are not forced
to choose between following their religion and obeying the law. This
application of the law is reminiscent of Justice Douglas’s concurring
151. See Custos, supra note 1, at 377 (naming the ECJ and the ECHR as two possible
forums for causes of action against legislation enacted by E.U. member states).
152. See id. at 379 (identifying Article 10 of the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights as the provision under which a claim could be brought before the ECJ).
153. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”). The Charter
continues:
This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others in public or in private, to manifest religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Id.
154. Custos, supra note 1, at 380.
155. See id. at 381 (“To the extent that the new legislative provision applies the same
rule, namely the ban on conspicuous signs to different categories of subjects, it constitutes a
uniform treatment of differently situated persons.”).
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opinion in Sherbet v. Verner: those with religious scruples that differ from
the majority should not have to choose between remaining faithful to an
important tenet of their religion and being loyal to the laws of their state.156
This juxtaposition creates a situation in which differently situated persons
are treated the same. Based on the ECJ’s previous decisions, this amounts
to discrimination.157
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, a challenge under the
E.U. Charter could be brought before the ECJ.158 While the E.U. Charter of
Fundamental Rights has been binding on E.U. member states since 2009,
the E.U. Constitution also contains a broad adoption of the Aristotelian
view of equality.159 However, the ECJ is unlikely to find in favor of a
potential challenge to the French statute due to the Court’s interpretation of
the E.U. Charter and the European Constitution in relation to the
constitutions of member states.160 Article II-112 of the European
Constitution gives significant deference to the traditions of member states
when they conflict with the fundamental rights laid out in the constitution
or in the E.U. Charter.161 Furthermore, Article II-112 also fully recognizes
the legitimacy of national statutes and case law.162 Because the French
156. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[M]any
people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society—beliefs that are protected by the
First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of ‘police’ or ‘health’
regulations reflecting the majority’s views.”) (emphasis added).
157. See Custos, supra note 1, at 381 (“To the extent the new legislative provision
applies the same rule . . . to different categories of subjects, it constitutes a uniform treatment
of differently situated persons.”).
158. See Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community 2007 O.J. (C 306) 13 available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF
(recognizing the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union).
159. See id. (stating that the European Constitution’s approach to equality could be
applicable to the French statute); see also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of
law . . . .”).
160. See Custos, supra note 1, at 384 (“[T]he ECJ seems, in final analysis, unlikely to
impose the Aristotelian conception of equality or to enforce equality rights of religious
minorities in France.”).
161. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. II-112, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
53 (“Insofar as this Charter recognizes fundamental rights as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in
harmony with those traditions.”).
162. See id. at 54 (“Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices . . . .”).
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statute is based on the uniquely French cultural notion of laicite, the ECJ is
likely to give deference to this important member state tradition and to
uphold the statute.
While a challenge based on the E.U. Charter is unlikely to be
successful, the Race Discrimination directive could provide adequate
foundation upon which the ECJ could find in favor of the potential
challenger.163 The directive’s purpose is to engrain the concept of equal
treatment in all E.U. member states; equal treatment meaning that “there
shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic
origin.”164 The directive further imposes a standard of review more lenient
than that used in U.S. courts, requiring that indirect discrimination through
a facially neutral action be justified by a legitimate state interest and that
the chosen means be appropriate.165 Indirect discrimination is at play in the
French statute. Though the statute is neutral on its face, in practice, it
subjects those whose religion requires them to cover their head to unequal
treatment by forcing them to choose between staying faithful to their beliefs
or breaking the law. The statute does not subject those without this
particular religious scruple to this choice, and—in a modern context—
affects Muslims exclusively. The ECJ would be faced with three issues in
determining whether the directive applies to this case. First, as a threshold
matter, the court would have to determine whether Muslim face coverings
implicate race or ethnicity as discussed in the directive.166 If the answer is
no, the court would need to determine whether a discrimination case
alleging indirect discrimination based on religion could be assimilated to
discrimination based on race or ethnicity.167 This would not be an easy
task. As previously discussed, the hijab can indicate religious affiliation,
cultural and ethnic affiliation, or both depending on the individual.168
163. See Custos, supra note 1, at 384 (indicating that the Race Discrimination Directive
could aid a potential challenger).
164. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (EC).
165. See id. at art. 2(2)(b) (“[I]ndirect discrimination shall . . . occur where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic
origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless . . . objectively
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary.”).
166. See Custos, supra note 1, at 385 (presenting the threshold questions facing the
ECJ.).
167. See id. (presenting the threshold questions facing the ECJ in order to determine
that the statute is discriminatory in practice despite being facially neutral).
168. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing the various meanings the hijab can have
for individuals).
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Second, the court would have to determine whether the preservation of
laicite is a legitimate aim and whether the banning of all head coverings is
an appropriate means of achieving that aim.169 Because of the high level of
deference afforded the traditional values of member states previously
discussed, it is likely that this prong of the analysis would focus mostly on
the suitability of the ban to preserving laicite.170 Third, and most critically,
the court would need to make a policy judgment on how to resolve the
divergence between the concept of equality inherent in the E.U. Charter and
the French principle of laicite.171
B. Challenge to the European Court of Human Rights
A potential challenger to the French headscarf ban could also bring a
suit alleging that the statute violates freedom of religion or the principle of
equality.172 Such a challenge would be brought under Article 9 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. This article guarantees the right to
freedom of religion in public or in private, subjecting this freedom only to
legal limitations necessary to protect democracy and public welfare.173 The
ECHR has upheld the freedom to follow a particular faith and the freedom
to practice one’s faith or absence of faith in the case law that has emerged

169. See id. (presenting the second prong necessary for the ECJ to analyze).
170. See id. (identifying laicite as a likely focus for the ECJ in determining whether the
government has demonstrated a legitimate aim for enacting the ban); see also discussion
supra Part II.B (discussing the importance of laicite in French culture).
171. See Custos, supra note 1, at 385 (“The crucial question is whether the ECJ would
choose to invoke its Aristotelian approach to equality and contradict a national universalist
approach under the Race discrimination directive . . . .”).
172. See id. at 386 (identifying freedom and religion and the principle of equality as
two possible grounds for a challenge before the ECHR).
173. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (outlining the article’s clause on
freedom on thought, conscience and religion).
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest
one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the
protections of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
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in this area since the 1990s.174 The court has gone so far as to conclude that
Article 9’s guarantee of “freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one
of the foundations of a ‘democratic society.’”175 However, the ECHR has
allowed freedom of religion to be restricted to protect the religious
pluralism inherent in many European states.176 The ECHR imposes a
significantly lower burden of proof on the state than the modern Supreme
Court imposes in Free Exercise cases in the United States.177 Similar to the
Sherbet balancing test, the ECHR requires that the statute in question
satisfy a compelling government interest and that it be proportionally
related to that interest.178 Were the court to determine that the genuine
purpose of the statute is to protect the principle of laicite and that the
banning of head-scarves in public serves this purpose, it is likely that the
ECHR will uphold the ban on the grounds that secularism is at the very
foundation of democratic societies in European states.
A challenge to the ECHR on the grounds of the principle of equality
would be very similar to such a challenge before the ECJ. The challenge
would be brought under Articles 14 and 9 of the European Convention of
Human Rights, which provide for the enjoyment of the freedoms of the
convention without discrimination on numerous grounds, including
religion.179 Again, so long as the court finds that the true purpose of the ban
is to protect laicite, it is unlikely that the ECHR will strike down the statute
174. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1993)
(upholding religious freedom of faith or absence of faith).
175. Id.
176. See Custos, supra note 1, at 387 (explaining the considerations taken by the ECHR
when evaluating religious equality and protection). Custos further stated:
Due consideration (by the ECHR) for the indissociable pluralism component
of . . . democracy makes it possible for states in which several religions coexist
to place restrictions on the manifestation of faith in order to reconcile the
respective interests of the different religious groups and ensure protection of all
religious beliefs.
Id. See also Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (upholding religious freedom of
faith or absence of faith).
177. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the evolution of the standard of proof
used by the Supreme Court in Free Exercise Clause cases).
178. See Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 36–50 (laying out the threeprong test the ECHR uses in assessing the legitimacy of statutes that allegedly infringe in the
free exercise of religion).
179. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 14, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (“The enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”).
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because of the deference given to the traditions of member states in
determining whether the state’s objective is a reasonable justification for
the discrimination.
The ECHR recently confronted this issue in Sahin v. Turkey.180 Ms.
Sahin challenged a Turkish university policy banning Islamic scarves on the
grounds that it violated her rights under several Convention articles,
including her freedom to manifest her religion under Article 9.181 The court
undertook a two-step analysis, first asking whether the State interfered in
Ms. Sahin’s right to practice her religion, and second asking whether the
interference was prescribed by law.182 After deciding that the prohibition
amounted to interference, the court conceded to Turkish domestic law in
deciding that so long as the prohibition had a basis in domestic law and was
written with reasonable foreseeability, it was properly prescribed by law.183
As this case is somewhat similar to a potential challenge to the French ban,
a study of it adds to the certainty that the ECHR is likely to uphold the
French ban.
VI. Recommendations
The implementation of the veil ban in France has already received
extensive criticism abroad.184 Because the French veil ban is based on
upholding laicite, the French Constitutional Council should reevaluate the
concept of laicite in the face of France’s changing demographics. Laicite,
though standing for the complete secularization of the French state, is
nonetheless grounded in the Catholic tradition.185 The Constitutional
180. See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 ¶ 115 (2005)
(holding that a Turkish University’s ban on Islamic scarves was not a violation of the
Convention).
181. See id. (holding that there was no violation of Ms. Sahin’s Article 9 rights).
182. See id. ¶ 75 (“The Court must consider whether the applicant’s right under
Article 9 was interfered with and, if so, whether the interference was ‘prescribed by law’,
pursued a legitimate aim and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ within the meaning at
Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.”).
183. See id. ¶ 81 (determining that there was an interference, but that the interference
was properly prescribed by Turkish law).
184. See Parliament Approves Ban on Full Veil in Public, FRANCE 24, Sept. 15, 2010,
http://www.france24.com/en/20100914-french-parliament-approves-ban-full-veil-publicsenate-law-fine-sarkozy-islam (indicating that international leaders, including President
Obama, have condemned the implementation of the veil ban).
185. See Custos, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing Catholicism’s former status as the
state religion in France, and its substantial role in shaping the concept of laicite).
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Council’s narrow interpretation of laicite was more relevant and plausible
when the largest distinction in French society was between Catholics and
Protestants, and not between entirely different religious traditions. As it
stands, the government’s use of laicite constitutes a “failure to fully account
for religious diversity.”186 By limiting how followers practice their faith,
the French government is attempting to use religions that do not require
apparent displays of affiliation, such as Christianity, to inform followers of
other religions and to transform the religious landscape of the nation.187 In
this case, the veil ban “implicitly relies upon one of the characteristics of
Catholicism, namely, the normalcy of discrete sartorial signs of religious
affiliation to proclaim a ban on conspicuous sartorial signs.”188 If the
government’s goal is to integrate Muslims more fully into French society, it
would be beneficial for lawmakers to redefine what secularism means in a
multicultural state and to change the way laicite informs the political
landscape of the nation. Given the international concern that the veil ban
has created, it is likely that the law, and the continued application of laicite
as it stands, will alienate many Muslims who see the hijab as an integral
part of their faith. If the concept underlying the veil ban were broadened to
allow voluntary expression of religious faith, the ban itself would no longer
be seen as a constraint on the religious rights of the Muslim community.
It would be beneficial for the French government to preserve Article
4 of the statute, which forbids forcing a woman to wear a veil in public.189
Although this Note has primarily focused on Article 1, Article 4 is likely to
be a source of tension among Muslims who believe their female relative
should be veiled without regard to the woman’s personal convictions.
Unlike Article 1, which forbids voluntary face covering, Article 4 does not
infringe on the right to voluntarily practice one’s faith.190 If the true motive
behind the ban is to protect the dignity of women who could potentially be
forced to wear the veil against their will, Article 4 is more appropriately
suited to a government interest than Article 1. Upholding Article 4 of the
statute would send the message that the French government intends to
186. Id.
187. See id. at 397 (“[T]he majority religion is set up as a model which not only
informs the drafting of the law but also serves as the reference for a process of
uniformization of the manifestation of religious belief in the public sphere.”).
188. Id.
189. Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344.
190. See id. (detailing the punishment for forcing another person to conceal his or her
face in public).
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uphold the dignity of women and is prepared to address a practice that is of
serious concern to the Muslim community and to women worldwide. This
choice would also serve the purpose of integrating Muslims more fully into
French society, since it does not require Muslim women to abandon what
many feel is an important tenet of their faith; it instead allows women to
choose how they manifest their faith.
VII. Conclusion
While a ban on Islamic head coverings in the United States is not
likely to pass muster at the Supreme Court level, it is clear that, in light of
the principle of laicite, the ban will be upheld in France. While it seems
counterintuitive to those accustomed to the American sense of liberty that
banning a religious symbol in public actually serves to protect the freedom
of religion, this is just the purpose that laicite serves. Even though the
French ban technically does not violate the French Constitution or the
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the French government has failed to
address the disparate impact this ban will have on its citizens, particularly
the female Muslim minority. While the government argues that the ban
will treat everyone equally, it is not acknowledging the fact that “the
enjoyment of religious freedom by those faithful to [the Catholic] majority
religion is de facto facilitated” while Muslims are forced to choose between
their faith and their country.191 Laicite ensures that all religions are treated
equally, and yet the principle itself is a product of the majority religion.192
This requires growing communities of non-Christians to discard certain
religious practices that are not customary in historically Christian societies.
Many Muslims and non-Muslims alike agree that forcing a woman to wear
the veil is a violation of her personal dignity.193 The French ban confronts
this serious issue plaguing the Middle East and—increasingly—Western
societies. However, the French government has failed to account for the
citizens who, in genuine religious conviction, choose on their own accord to
wear the veil as a manifestation of Islam.

191. Id.
192. See id. (“[T]he majority religion is set up as a model which not only informs the
drafting of the law but also serves as the reference for a process of uniformization of the
manifestation of religious belief in the public sphere.”).
193. See generally Taylor, supra note 10.

